SOUTH ASIA’S STRATEGIC SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
Ehsan Mehmood Khan
Abstract
South Asia is home to nearly
one-fourth of humanity. It also has one of the largest arrays of territorial and
non-territorial disputes in the world. The region has witnessed several
interstate wars and warlike situations besides a number of intrastate
insurgencies, ethnic discords and confrontations in the last about seven
decades. As a consequence, the strategic security environment of the region is
overshadowed by traditional military security of the state. Human security of virtually 1.57
billion people remains hostage to the security perceptions based on the
nature of conflicts rather than human sufferings based on shared realities.
This paper analyzes key expressions and manifestations of the security paradigm
so as to recommend practicable measures for a comprehensive, cooperative and
holistic security framework.
Introduction
History,
geography, demography, and political opportunity structure intermix to
formulate national purpose, interests and inspirations of a state. National interests stipulate
economic, social and political priorities. These, in turn, shape a strategic
construct – strategic mindset and security paradigm – consistent with the power
potential of the nation. The string goes down to the lowest rung in a
manner that it receives light from the national purpose to the extent it must.
While economic, social and political concerns are debated openly by the
policymakers and strategic planners, they often downplay the imprints of
religion on decision making and policy formulation process. At any rate,
religious beliefs play a consequential role in evolution of strategic culture
and concerns of a country or region.
All
this is as much true in case of South Asian countries as it is for any other
state, whether big or small, developed or developing, and overtly theological
or ostensibly secular. However, South Asia’s strategic culture is quite
different from other major regions of the world because of its peculiar security
issues and atypical security calculus. Geo-historic, geo-political, geo-strategic and
geo-economic and geo-cultural dimensions together play their part in making and
maintaining the security construct of the region. Besides, security
interests of major powers of the world create an unbreakable interface thereby
leaving irremovable imprints on the regional security landscape.
South
Asia is one of the most
militarized zones in the world and home to inter-state and intra-state wars.
Having remained in a state of conflict for centuries, and especially since
1947, it has turned into a
“Corridor of Instability” on the globe. Security problems of the region range from traditional to
non-traditional and state security to human security. State security
overshadows human security in a number of ways, and people remain to be the
ultimate sufferers. Thus, the region is hostage to a security web of its own,
and would seemingly remain so in the decades to come.
Location and Makeup
Located
in the heart of Asia, the South Asian region physically stretches from the Hindu Kush to the Malay
Peninsula and from the Indian Ocean to the Himalayas,[1]
and is bordered by the Middle East, Central Asia, China and South East Asia.
This way, it is a meeting
point for various important regions on the globe. Thus, events and activities in South
Asia directly affect the contiguous regions and indirectly affect
remaining parts of the world. Likewise, any sort of developments in the
adjacent regions, too, reflect on the South Asian affairs.
Traditionally,
South Asia has been
understood as a region comprising seven countries namely Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. However, an extended
definition of the area in keeping with the archives of the UN shows Afghanistan too as part of South
Asia. Figure-1 illustrates.[2]
It is of note that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) initially consisted of
seven countries. Later, Afghanistan, too, became a member. The
composition of South Asia in this paper is, hence, based on the UN definition
of South Asia as well as present membership of SAARC.
There is a
unique mismatch between the population and landmass of the region (Figure-2).[3]
For instance, South Asia’s
population (1,577,744,692) when combined with that of China (1,338,612,968)
comes to 2,677,225,936 and is thus 54% of this total (Figure-3).[4]
On the other hand, the region
has nearly 35% of the territorial area when combined with that of China
(9,596,961 square kilometre). Similarly, compared with the European Union, the region has
virtually thrice more population (1,577,744,692 vis-à-vis 491,582,852).
To put it in global comparison, South Asia has 23.23% of world population (6,790,062,216) dwelling
on 1% of the globe (510.072 million square kilometre).[5]
These comparisons have been given herein for the reason that demographic and
territorial composition of South Asia has a concrete linkage with makeup of its
security paradigm.
South Asia has a diverse territory ranging from fertile plains to
vast desert stretches and the highest mountain ranges in the world. To
note, top thirteen
mountain peaks of the world are located in the Karakoram and Himalaya mountain
ranges of South Asia.[6]
The region has tremendous tapped and untapped natural resources. Throughout the
recorded history of the region, it attracted traders and invaders especially
from the Central Asia and the Middle East. Intermarriages, immigration and
settlements changed the demography of the region to a great extent. Likewise,
it paved a way for new religions and languages. Today, South Asia is home to a number of major world
religions, ethnic tribes, races and languages. All these are inalienable
features of security outlook in the region. There are numerous other
expressions e.g. sects within Islam and Christianity, and castes within
Hinduism. Thus, South Asia has tremendous heterogeneity, which adds complexity
to the already intricate security atmosphere.
Inter-state conflicts involve huge unsettled
territory; indeed, unparalleled with territorial disputes elsewhere in
the world. This, source of conflict, is the most dangerous dimension of
security in the region. This needs dexterity and statesmanship on part of the
South Asian leadership so as to manage security and maintain stability in the
region. With unsettled
inter-state disputes and unmediated intra-state ethnic interests, human
security atmosphere of the region remains clothed in despair and desolation.
This calls for a regional
approach to interconnection, interdependence, integration and unity within the
diversity, which is supported by the UN Charter, too.[7]
Dynamics and Manifestations of
Security Paradigm
South
Asia is at war with itself. This densely populated chunk of territory on the
globe is heavily
militarized too. The region
is carrying the burden of history. Historical memories of the partition of India in 1947,
the colonial legacies
and more so, the Muslim
rule in India before the British colonized it, have left strong imprints
on the hearts and minds of the people, which are acting as psychological
determinant in virtually all human affairs including the statecraft. It is here
that the religion interacts with security. These are, thus, a major impediment
on the way to concord and conciliation, and a stumbling block for regional
security and stability. The state
policies are influenced by political concerns and security perceptions from top
to bottom. Due to the same reasons, even the most technical issues pending solution, often,
transform into geo-political moorings and politico-military disputes.
This has given birth to an intricate security template and conflict landscape.
South
Asia’s dynamics of conflict that shape up the regional security environment have four principal
motivations namely the historical memories, colonial legacies, ethnicity and foreign linkages.
These motivations transform into dangerous expressions leading to drastic
consequences for the individual states and societies as well the region as a
whole, as shown in Figure-4.[8]
The ultimate product of this complex nature of security environment is an
unremitting instability, which leads to primacy of militarism rather than
humanism. Key
manifestations of security paradigm are (Figure-5):[9]
inter-state wars; intra-state insurgencies; conflict management rather than
resolution; an unending conventional arms race; nuclearization (of India and
Pakistan); interventional politics i.e. regional intervention; extra-regional
intervention (e.g. presence of foreign forces in form of International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan);[10]
and human insecurity, which is a by-product of some of these and a cogent
reason for others.
This has embedded a sort of mini Cold War
in the region especially in case of the two largest countries i.e. India and
Pakistan, which keeps playing its role even in softer human affairs like sports and cultural activities.
For instance, a cricket match between India and Pakistan is taken nothing less than a military
encounter, though in non-kinetic form, by many people of two countries.[11]
It
is of note that South Asia
is home to the world’s oldest surviving UN mission, United Nations Military
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The UNMOGIP dates back to January 1949 and
operates on either side of the Ceasefire Line (now the Line of Control)
between the two parts of Kashmir; Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Indian-Occupied
Kashmir.[12]
India-Centric
Regional Disputes
The region is home to the world’s largest
territorial disputes. Important to note is that most of them involve India,
thereby instituting an India-centric security paradigm in South Asia. Key ones
to name are: India-China
Aksai Chin dispute; India-China South Tibet/ Arunachal Pradesh dispute;[13]
India-Pakistan Kashmir dispute; India-Pakistan Sir Creek dispute;
India-Pakistan dispute over construction of dams by India in violation of the
Indus Water Treaty; Pak-Afghan argument over cross border movement of
militants; India-Bangladesh border dispute over 51 Bangladeshi enclaves and 111
Indian enclaves; India-Bangladesh sea boundary dispute over New Moore/ South
Talpatty/Purbasha Island in the Bay of Bengal;[14]
India-Bangladesh Farraka Dam dispute; India-Nepal Boundary dispute including
400 squares kilometres on the source of Kalapani River; and India’s argument
over militants’ crossing with Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma and Bhutan. Figure-6
illustrates.[15]
Kashmir, nevertheless, remains the site of
the world’s largest and most militarized territorial dispute.[16]
It is often referred to as a nuclear flash point on the globe. Kashmir is not only an
unfinished agenda of the partition but also an unresolved dispute of the
UN. The UNSC adopted various resolutions in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 to
resolve the issue democratically but it has yet to succeed. For instance, in
1951 the UNSC, through a resolution endorsed, “Reminding the governments and
authorities concerned of the principle embodied in its resolutions 47 (1948) of
21 April 1948, 51 (1948) of 3 June 1948 and 80 (1950) of 14 March 1950 and the
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the
final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance
with the will of the people expressed through democratic method of a free and
impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations…”[17]
To
this end, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had articulated: “I should like to make it
clear that [the] question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed
in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have
repeatedly made public, is that [the] question of accession in any disputed
territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people
and we adhere to this view.”[18] He
further pronounced, “We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to
be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has
supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not,
and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have
been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like
the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people,
and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster [sic]
offer.”[19]
The
plebiscite could never be held. The issue not only remains unresolved but is
even more complicated today. More than the territorial area or geo-strategic interests
of the nations, Kashmir is a human security issue for millions of people, some
of whom are living in a split family status and many of them as refugee for the
last about seven decades. The territorial area of Kashmir is 222,236 square
kilometres (total on both sides of the Line of Control). It is only a little
less than the United Kingdom’s 243,610 square kilometres and more than the
territorial areas of Bangladesh (143,998 square kilometres) and North Korea
(120,538 square kilometres), and virtually double the area of Bulgaria (110,879
square kilometres). It is nearly five times larger than the territorial areas
of Denmark (43,094 square kilometres) and Netherlands (41,543 square
kilometres). These figures have been given to put it in comparative perspective.
The South Asian nations also have hosts of non-territorial arguments.
Interstate Conventional Wars
The
territorial and
non-territorial issues have, in the past led to wars between India and Pakistan
in 1948, 1965 and 1971, and India and China in 1962. Skirmishes between India and Bangladesh border
security forces are also a routine bulletin in the region. Besides, the Line of Control
(formerly the Ceasefire Line) in Kashmir is in a virtual state of war since
1947.
Intrastate Arguments and Insurgencies
All
the eight South Asian nations are home to different types of ethnic arguments,
confrontation, insurgencies, violence and militancy. The key ones to note are: Taliban Movement in Afghanistan
and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan;[20]
Maoist insurgency in seven
out of total 28 states of India (aptly termed as the seven sisters); Naxilite insurgency in India,
which Dr Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister, termed as the single
biggest internal security threat[21]
(the area affected by Naxilism is popularly termed as the Red Corridor);[22]
LTTE in Sri Lanka;[23]
the Maoists insurgency in
Nepal, which lasted till 2006 and is passing through post-culmination
settlement phase; and insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts region of
Bangladesh.[24]
As
a matter of fact, there are hundreds of militant organizations operating in
South Asia.[25]
Take the case of India;
there are virtually 200 armed terrorist organizations / groups – most of them
from the majority Hindu community – that have picked up arms against the
state and minority communities with one motive or the other.[26]
Recently, India’s Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde stated, “We have got
an investigation report that be it the RSS or BJP, their training camps are
promoting Hindu terrorism. We are keeping a strict vigil on all this. We will
have to think about it seriously and will have to remain alert.”[27] This is too late a confession, indeed. A lot
of damage has already been done.
South
Asia has now become home to transnational terrorism with streaks of global
terrorism, too. Pakistan
and Afghanistan are facing the worst kind of terrorism on the globe with
international and regional terrorist organizations operating in the
mountainous border region receiving support from other countries.
Regional Interventions
Interventional politics is part
of the security paradigm in South Asia. While it is true in some other
cases too, India,
the largest country both in terms of territory and population and with hegemonic desires and designs,
has never missed an
exploitable opportunity in any country of the region. Indian intervention in Sri Lanka
in form of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987 was a militaristic
expression, still fresh to the memories of the Sri Lankan people.[28]
India has always been interfering
in Balochistan province of Pakistan during various rounds of militancy there.
It is also using its presence in Afghanistan to nurture trouble in Pakistan. To
this end, Charles Timothy
Chuck Hagel, the 24th US Secretary of Defense, in a speech at
Oklahoma’s Cameron University in 2011, articulated without mincing a word:
“India for some time has always used Afghanistan as a second front … India has
over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border.”[29]
Earlier, Dr Christine
Fair, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, said in 2009: “I
think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan's apprehensions about
Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having
visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not
issuing visas as the main activity. Moreover, India has run operations from its
mission in Mazar and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has
reopened in Jalalabad and Kandahar along the (Pak-Afghan) border.”[30]
India has expanded and extended
its military presence in the region. It is particularly expanding westward. For
instance, it has declared diplomatic presence in eight cities of Iran and Afghanistan to include:
Iran – Embassy in Tehran and consulates in Bandar Abbas and Zahedan;
Afghanistan – Embassy in Kabul and consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat,
Jalalabad and Kandahar. Besides, it has declared non-diplomatic presence
both in Iran and Afghanistan. Its largest project in Iran is revamping of Chahbahar port.
India is running 84
different projects in Afghanistan especially in the provinces of Kandahar,
Zaranj, Herat, Mazare-e-Sharif, Pul-e-Khumri and Kunar.[31] There
is strong evidence that the Indian intelligence agencies are working as part of
all these projects. India has extended its outreach beyond Afghanistan. An Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter
squadron of MiG 29 is stationed at Farkhor Airbase, some 130 kilometres
southeast of Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe since 2004-05. Earlier, India
had renovated Ayni airbase located 15 kilometres west of Dushanbe at a cost of
$70 million.[32]
Later, they changed the plan and stationed the IAF squadron at Farkhor.
Certainly, India has stationed these to pursue strategic military objectives
and not to carry out humanitarian activities. India has also established a
naval listening post in northern Madagascar, off Africa’s east coast, to gather
intelligence on foreign navies.[33] Indian
naval presence is also reported around Jaffna and Trincomalee Harbour in Sri
Lanka, the Maldives and Strait of Malacca. This is, indeed, a brief picture of
India’s military activities beyond its borders aimed at strangulating the
countries of the region.
Conventional Forces
South
Asian nations are maintaining
large-size conventional military forces to clothe the idea of traditional state
security. The active duty manpower in the armed forces of six countries
is 2,548,000 soldiers. Country-wise manpower is shown in Figure-7.[34]
This does not include the manpower of civil armed forces (CAF), other second
line forces and task-specific security forces. The figures of remaining two
countries i.e. Bhutan and Maldives have not been included being insignificant.
Even the active armed forces manpower of the six countries mentioned herein is
more than the individual population of 195 countries and semi-independent
entities of the world. It is more than the total population of Australia, New
Zealand, Yemen and Ghana (individually). Also, it is more that the population
of three South Asian countries to include Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives
(individually), a little more than the combined population of Sri Lanka and
Maldives, and more than double the combined population of Bhutan and Maldives.[35]
On the average, South Asia has nearly one active duty soldier to each square
kilometre of territory, whether inhabited or uninhabited.
The security environment has led to a
unique kind of arms race in the region. Domestic arms production and
acquisition of military equipment from abroad continues. Indigenously, India
and Pakistan are producing, assembling or overhauling fighter jets, helicopters,
tanks, armoured vehicles, warships, submarines, frigates, artillery guns, small
arms, mines, grenades and a lot more. On
the whole, South Asia’s military expenditures have seen an increase of 41% from
1999 to 2008.[36] India became the 10th
largest defence spender in the world in 2009[37] and
the 8th largest in 2012. South Asia’s military spending are given in
Table 1.1.[38]
Table 1.1: Military Spending in South Asia 2012
(previous years in some cases)
|
Country
|
Military
Spending
(US$ billions)
|
World Ranking
|
|
India
|
46.219
|
7
|
|
Pakistan
|
5.16
|
33
|
|
Sri Lanka
|
1.280
|
65
|
|
Bangladesh
|
1.137
|
68
|
|
Afghanistan
|
0.250
|
97
|
|
Nepal
|
0.207
|
104
|
Source: SIPRI
Yearbook 2013.[39]
It may be seen that India is spending at least 7 to 8 times more
than the total defence budget of remaining South Asian countries. It is also of note that these
are the expenditures declared through annual budgets. Actual outlay is
certainly more than that as several military activities remain discreet and
unannounced. Such activities include impromptu defence purchases from abroad,
expenditures on intelligence agencies/ activities, and the expenditures on
unconventional forces e.g. nuclear and missile programmes. This consequently
eats into the public taxes and national capital which could otherwise be spent
on the well-being of the hapless populace.
Nuclearization
This
is yet another thread of South Asia’s security paradigm. The Small Nuclear
Forces predicted in South Asia in mid-1980s are not as small now.[40]
As of today, located in the Eastern Nuclear Cauldron (Figure-8),[41] India
and Pakistan have sizeable arsenals of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads
– enough to wage a wide-ranging war even though nukes are being used as weapons
of foreign rather than defence policy, and war prevention rather than war
fighting. Albeit one nuclear bomb is sufficient to destroy a city of the size
of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, or even Delhi or Lahore in case the circumstances
lead to nuclear war fighting, however, reports indicate India and Pakistan to
be possessing dozens of warheads. One of the sources puts it at 60 to 80
nuclear warheads in case of India and 70 to 90 possessed by Pakistan.[42]
India-China Rivalry
South
Asia’s security environment has numerous extra-regional linkages too. India-China border dispute has
the biggest shadow on the security environment of South Asia. India-China rivalry, indeed,
goes beyond the disputes over Aksai Chin and South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh). Both are vying
for regional dominance and a pronounced role in global affairs. Consequently,
both are pursuing to extend their strategic security parameter. India-China
maritime rivalry in the Indian Ocean in order to control the strategic sea
routes is a real time issue. They do not share maritime border; yet, they are
emerging as rivals to dominate the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific Ocean. The
littoral areas are coming up as the new combat zone. For instance, China has
built naval facilities, radars and signal-intelligence (SIGINT) posts all along
the Myanmar coast and in Coco Islands. On the other hand, India and Myanmar
signed Kaladan River transportation agreement in April 2008 that involves
India’s upgradation of Myanmar’s Sittwe Port. Likewise both have a competition to control the Strait of
Malacca, a choke point between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, which is
extremely important for China for its strategic supply lines. In 2005, India
started conducting naval patrolling with Thailand in the Andaman Sea.
Although the patrols were primarily directed against maritime crimes, these
also served to restrict Chinese activities in the area.[43]
Extra-Regional Linkages and
Interests of Major Powers
Extra-regional
linkages and interest of major powers in the region is yet another and very
important dimension of South Asia’s security paradigm. India-US and
India-Russia nuclear deals have further exacerbated the security environment of
the region and paved the way for arms race at the expense of socio-economic
development of over 1.57 billion people of the region. Presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, in
Central Asia, over Arabian Peninsula and in the Indian Ocean is but one such
manifestation of the issue. Extra-regional intervention like ISAF/NATO in
Afghanistan has overshadowed the entire gamut of regional security.
Drone attacks in Afghanistan and FATA of Pakistan have added a new dimension to
the security landscape of the region. The drone issue has generated an extended
debate across the globe, which is likely to lead to some logical end.
Human Insecurity
Human
security in South Asia is overshadowed by the primacy of traditional state
security.[44]
National exchequers, which could otherwise be spent on well-being of over 1.57
billion South Asian people, are rather a source of sustenance for state
security mechanism. Human
security is not a priority in regional security arena due to longstanding disputes
and shared threat perceptions, which instead work towards reinforcing
the state security system. The region is home to largest number of
adult illiterates, largest number of out-of-school children, largest number of
unemployed adults, largest number of households without electricity and tap
water, largest number of malnourished individuals and largest number of people
suffering from lack of access to basic health facilities in the world. The list goes on and needs an
independent study to deal with the subject. In sum, human security is held
hostage to the traditional security and cannot be improved till such time that
the security paradigm is balanced between traditional and non-traditional
security needs.
Conflict Resolution: the
Limiting Factors
Conflict prevention, conflict
management, conflict settlement and conflict resolution are different facets of
statecraft. In case of South Asia, these are neither being desirably debated in
academic circles, nor being implemented at policy level in a desired fashion.
More often than not, the political leadership of South Asia is found boasting
about their efforts on the way of peace. However, “peace” to them often means
conflict prevention or management, and certainly not conflict settlement or
resolution.
Conflict
resolution takes place through political process. Media, intelligentsia, think
tanks and civil society facilitate the process by providing platforms for
discussions and negotiations, and cultivating the environment for political
initiatives. In case of South Asia, the entire process is corroded and complete
procedure is flawed. The most critical element in conflict resolution is for
the parties to seek resolution. If policy-makers do not believe that they can
achieve by unilateral action what they want, they look for alternatives. This
is the stage where there is some scope for conflict resolution.[45] Harold
Hal Saunders, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
Affairs between 1978 and 1981, noted: “In many cases, developing the commitment
to negotiate is the most complex part of the peace process because it involves
a series of interrelated judgments. Before leaders will negotiate, they have to
judge: (1) whether or not a negotiated solution would be better than continuing
the present situation; (2) whether a fair settlement could be fashioned that
would be politically manageable; (3) whether leaders on the other side could
accept the settlement and survive politically; and, (4) whether the balance of
forces would permit an agreement on such a settlement. In more colloquial
language, leaders ask themselves: How much longer can this present situation go
on? Is there another way and could I live with it politically?”[46]
Certainly,
the states are the key parties to the conflicts such as those faced by South
Asia. States are represented by their institutions like the governments and
political parties, etc. South Asian leadership does not show political will to
settle or resolve the contending issues. Dispute, both territorial and non-territorial
are used as political slogans and election cards. In case a given political
party shows some leaning to move a mile forward on the way of peacemaking and
conflict resolution, the contending political parties pull the process back by
a myriad mile by demonizing the political party showing resolve as “being
involved” in national “sell-out.” India has a worst history in this regard.
Indian think tanks often reverse the political process. They are mostly found
involved in research and reflection on conflict rather than peace, terrorism
rather than counterterrorism, and state security rather than human security.
One cannot name a single research institute or think tank in India, which would
go against popular content or conventional wisdom apropos conflict resolution
in South Asia albeit India itself is the centre of conflict in the region due
to various types of disputes with all countries bordering it.
Recommended Regional Security
Framework
International
experience shows that the regional security paradigm can best grow and sustain
under a cooperative, comprehensive and holistic framework facilitated by
meaningful conflict-resolution endeavours. The formats of European Union (EU),
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and African Union (AU) etc bear testimony to the
fact. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), on the other
hand, has rather reduced to a meet, greet and depart forum. South Asia
must also embrace the notion of a comprehensive, cooperative, collaborative,
integrative and all-inclusive security paradigm. Recommended framework is as
follows:
Resuscitation and Revitalization of SAARC: For
the purpose of regional approach to conflict-resolution, SAARC should be both
resuscitated and revitalized. The SAARC Charter needs to be expanded and redefined with the regional
security as an imperative and the foremost article.
South Asia Security Dialogue (SASD): In
line with OSCE and ARF, South Asia should institute SASD from the platform of SAARC. SASD should involve all SAARC states
as members and US, EU and China as facilitators. SASD should primarily
work to resolve the impending territorial and non-territorial disputes in the region. This institution should consist
of various working groups (WGs) for each dispute in the region. All
issues should be discussed, debated and dialogued at working groups level
involving officials, civil society representatives and global enablers. WGs should formulate their
recommendations for the policy level. In case of crosscurrents between
two or more issues, joint working groups may be formed. The progress is
dependent on the political will of the leadership. Hence, if one issue is not
resolved, it should not cast back on resolution of the other issues. If SASD
functions in line with the spirit of this proposal, it would help resolve the
regional disputes in a graduated manner.
South Asia Nuclear Dialogue (SAND): SAND
should be established as a corollary to the SAARC in line with SASD with same
membership and facilitation level. SAND should first help India and Pakistan to work on nuclear risk
reduction and nuclear-cum-missile restraint measures. Then, it should work
to persuade the two
nations on maintenance of minimum credible deterrence rather than maximum
possible deterrence. If SASD succeeds in resolving major disputes in
South Asia, especially between India and Pakistan, SAND should work on de-nuclearization
of the region.
Conventional Arms Reduction Dialogue
(CARD): Conventional
arsenals of all South
Asian countries are swelling with each tick-of-the-click. Likewise,
against the global winds of reduction in the size of standing armies, South
Asians are moving uphill. Major share of the defence budget is consumed either
on manpower related administrative aspects or production and purchase of
military hardware. Certainly, India shares greater burden due to the India-centric disputes and security
paradigm in the region. CARD, which should be composed and organized in
line with SASD and SAND, should work with the states of the region on reduction
of conventional arms as well as manpower. The states would, thus, be able to
divert the capital spared by reduction in defence budgets to address the human
security issues.
South Asian Parliament (SAP): The
case of a South Asian
Parliament (SAP) may be considered as an organ of SAARC. It may comprise
equal number of members
from all eight countries of the region. Ten members from each state is a respectable figure.
The membership may be based on ex parliamentarians, intellectuals, media
persons, lawyers and experts in different fields. Speakership of SAP should revolve between the member
states on biannual basis. This means that the turn of each country would come after four
years. The purpose and mandate of SAP should be to provide an interactive forum, serve as a
regional forum for exchange of ideas and proffer recommendations to the member states
on important issues of mutual interest.
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs):
CBMs at the level of state are of utmost importance for the
purpose of creating a dialogue-supportive environment based on mutual-trust.
CBMs are to be initiated
alongside the proceedings of SAARC, SASD, SAND and CARD. A number of
measures may be initiated by the states. Key ones are: relaxation of visa requirements for movement of
people within the region; visa-free movement of the people of Kashmir on either
side; setting free each other’s prisoners as a good will; issuance of friendly
rather than inflammatory statements by national leaders; tangible cessation of
interference in each other’s affairs and reduction of forces on borders. In
case of India-Pakistan relations, India has always talked of CBMs, which
would consequently cultivate environment for dialogue on major issues including
the core issue of Kashmir. It is considered that talks on the territorial
disputes are the biggest leap on the way to confidence building and mere
“people-to-people” gestures as often advocated by India can be of no use.
People-to-People Contacts (PPC):
PPC at the level of societies would help cleanse the
stains of historical memories and reduce tension. Inter-parliamentary commissions
and dialogues, and forums of interaction between the people from various walks
of life e.g. investors, traders, students, media persons, academics and
intellectuals will be of the essence in this regard. People will
certainly seek to concentrate on human security rather than the traditional
state security. Eventually, this would work as a complimentary axis of conflict
resolution.
Multi-Tracked Diplomacy (MTD):
MTD has helped in easing up tension in
South Asia in the past. A host of models may be adopted and put into action on
the sidelines of other initiatives. It could take the shape as follows: Track-1, state-to-state meets
between the diplomats and officials; Track-2, regional diplomatic ventures
involving more than one (or all regional) states; Track-3, societal engagement
involving the civil society and citizenry; and Track-4, involvement of global
enablers in Track-1 or 2 or combination of both.
Intra-Region Trade: Intra-region trade in
South Asia is abysmally low. South
Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which could have been the greatest success of
SAARC, is held up due to security moorings of the SAARC members. The
states have, heretofore, preferred to work on either bilateral/ preferential trade agreements within
the region or are depending on extra-regional trade. SAFTA should not only be
signed and ratified by all SAARC members but should also be put into action in
keeping with the universal definition of free trade. It should be taken as a
comprehensive subject. Trade should not only mean the duty-free flow of
goods across the borders but should also involve provision of investment
opportunities and free movement of labour.
Human Security under all Circumstances: It is imperative for the South Asian leadership to agree to
at least one fundamental
agenda that the people would remain a priority under all circumstances
and that the human security aspects would not be interfered with even during
warlike situations. SAARC should help bring the states and societies closer.
The human security spheres in which it can be of use are as follows:
inter-state transfer of experience; trade; education and literacy; healthcare
including combating epidemics; environmental security and disaster management;
food security; river water-sharing treaties and agreements between the states;
and resolution of ethnic discords.
South Asia Literacy Commission (SALC): Illiteracy is the worst human security
challenge faced by South Asia. To
combat illiteracy at regional level so as to complement the efforts of the
states, it is recommended to institute SALC under the auspices of SAARC. It should be formed as an
independent body and should have its membership based on reputed educationists.
The governments should
only be interacting with SALC for the purpose of funding and facilitation, and
should have no role in its proceedings. SALC should be monetarily supported by South Asia
Literacy Fund (SALF), a subsidiary established for the purpose, the management
of which should fall in the realm of SALC. The Commission should launch
a targeted campaign against illiteracy opening area-specific SALC institutions
including at least one world class university in each country with teaching staff
from all member states but students from the host country. SALC technical
institutes should be established in all member states in keeping with the
requirements of host state. It should also establish elementary education
institutes in the areas with high illiteracy rate. Later, the spheres of its
activities may be expanded by establishing more universities and institutes.
SALC should also be utilized as a forum for inter-state movement of students
for studying in public and private institutions of any SAARC member country.
South
Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA): SAFMA already exists as an institution of SAARC. Nevertheless, there is a dire need
to revitalize it. SAFMA can help create and maintain a dialogue-supportive
environment. The institution itself needs to work out a code of conduct
for being a collaborator rather than contender, and an institution for regional
integration rather than a mouthpiece of any single state.
Conclusion
South Asia is in need of introspection
more than ever before. It has remained in a perpetual state of war in
traditional and nontraditional forms for the last many decades. Must it reach
the mark of a 100-year war? Such a proposition would, certainly, be useless
both for South Asian states and societies, and individuals and communities.
Hence, there is a need to tilt the mass of regional security paradigm from
traditional state security to human security. It is of note that whereas
traditional state security is often based on perceptions, human security is a
manifestation of shared realities. It must be noted that no state of the region
would relegate the traditional state security paradigm due to the nature of
conflict. However, the acme of leadership would be to create and maintain
balance between state security and human security in a manner that both
complement each other.
South Asia has a great potential to
progress in the comity of nations on the globe, if it embraces the concept of
human security as part of a cooperative and comprehensive security paradigm.
Human security of virtually 1.57 billion people would certainly work to
complement the state security. For this, the South Asian leadership needs to
depart from a tested but failed system of state security and embrace an all-acceptable
notion of human security. An adequate level of human security achieved as a
consequence would surely ensure the security of states too, thereby re-modeling
the security paradigm in a universally accepted fashion.
International community is expected to
share some burden by making possible a dialogue for the purpose of
conflict-resolution in South Asia. This would have dividends not only for the
South Asians but for the entire world. Success of the world community would
surely boost up the confidence of the one-fourth of the human race living in
South Asia in the global leadership. This would also help make a concrete case
for denuclearization and arms reduction in the region. In sum, dividends are
countless but need regional as well as global resolve; the earlier, the better!
[1] Rob Johnson, A region in
turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947 (London: Reaktion Books Ltd,
2005), 7.
[2] Map by the writer. UN Map of
South Asia also shows Afghanistan as part of the region. Details may be found
at “UN map of South Asia,” www.un.org/depts/Cartographic/map/profile/Souteast-Asia.pdf (accessed June 29, 2013).
[3] Illustration by the writer.
Data obtained from CIA – the World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html
and
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html?countryName=United%20States%20Pacific%20Island%20Wildlife%20Refuges&countryCode=um®ionCode=au&rank=237#um
(accessed December 9, 2009).
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Highest Mountain Peaks of the
World,” National Geographic Society, quoted in
http://www.abell.org/nal/PDFs/World_Stats/Highest%20Peaks%20in%20the%20World.pdf
(accessed December 11, 2009).
[7] Article 53-54 to Chapter VIII
of UN Charter.
[8] Conceptualized and illustrated
by the writer.
[9] Ibid.
[10] A part of ISAF may withdraw from
Afghanistan in 2014, as announced by the US and NATO. However, presence of
foreign forces in and around the region is likely to remain a reality during
the decades ahead.
[11] The word military encounter
used metaphorically considering the response of emotionally charged (more than
passionate) crowed. In some cases it has led to very untoward incidents in
matches between India and Pakistan.
[12] Further details may be found at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/facts.html (accessed July 8,
2013).
[13] The disputed territory is
located south of the famous McMahon Line agreed to between the Britain and
Tibet as part of the Simla Accord signed in 1914, which China has never
endorsed as the Tibetan government was not sovereign and thus did not have the
power to conclude treaties with other countries. Indo-China War of 1962 took
place over the same dispute.
[14] Interestingly, some common
Indians claim the Indian Ocean to be belonging to India. Likewise, common
Bangladeshis too lay a complete claim on the Bay of Bengal.
[15] Illustration by the writer.
[16] CIA – The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (accessed November 29, 2009)
[17] UNSC Resolution 90 (1951) dated
31 January 1951.
[18] J. C.
Aggarwal and S. P. Agrawal, Modern History of Jammu and Kashmir:
Volume I - Ancient Times to Shimla Agreement (New Delhi:
Concept Publishing Company, 1995), 35.
[19] Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence
and After: A Collection of Speeches, 1946-1949 (New York: The John Day
Company, Inc., 1950), 59. Originally published by the Publication Division,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi. Reprinted
by the John Day Company in 1950 and 1971.
[20] Taliban are one of the fiercest
armed group in South Asia and the biggest security challenge facing the
prospects of peace in the region.
[21] “ Manmohan:
Naxalism the greatest internal threat” The Hindu, New Delhi, October 12,
2009.
[22] Armed Marxist revolutionaries
known as Naxilites – named after the 1967 revolt by farmers in the West Bengal
village of Naxalbari, which spreads across the poor Indian states. “Kapil
Komireddi: Blood runs India’s Red Corridor” The Guardian, April 23,
2009.
[23] Albeit, the LTTE has been
overpowered by Sri Lankan Armed Forces in 2009 and the LTTE Chief Vellupillai
Prabhakaran was killed, yet, the threat exists in form of the LTTE ideology and
many Sri Lankans fear that they might rise head again.
[24] The conflict in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts (CHT) dates back to pre-Bangladesh times, when it was East
Pakistan. CHT saw a fierce insurgency
from 1977 to 1997 waged against the government by (United People's Party of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts and its militant wing named the Shanti Bahini). They
demanded autonomy for the indigenous people, the Chakma people, who are mainly
Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and Animists. The insurgency has officially
receded since 1997 but the conflict continues as the roots of conflict exist.
[25] There are so many militant
groups in South Asia with so long a list of dreadful acts that it needs a
separate and all-inclusive study to cover and conclude.
[26] Ehsan Mehmood Khan, Human
Security in Pakistan (Islamabad: Narratives, 2013), 22.
[27] For details see, “BJP, RSS conducting ‘terror training’
camps, says Shinde,” The Indian Express, January 21, 2013.
[28] Details may be
found in a number of topical accounts e.g. Depinder Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Trishul Publications, 1992).
[29] Rama Lakshmi, “Chuck Hagel
confirmed in Washington, but doubts remain in India,” The Washington Post,
February 27, 2013.
[30] “What is problem with
Pakistan?” Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan
(accessed on July 1, 2013).
[31] Peter Wonacott, “India
Befriends Afghanistan, Irking Pakistan,” The Wall Street Journal, August
19, 2009.
[32] Matthew Stein, “Compendium of
Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” Foreign Military Studies
Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 (October 3, 2012): 2-6.
[33] Siddharth Srivastava, “India
drops anchor in the Maldives,” World Security Network, September 2,
1009,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/India/siddharth-srivastava/India-drops-anchor-in-the-Maldives
(accessed July 1, 2013).
[34] Illustration by the writer.
Data obtained from Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert Hammond and Andrew Gagel, “The
Military Balance in Asia: 1990-2011, A Quantitative Analysis,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C. (May 16, 2011): 93.
[35] List available at “Country
Comparison: Population,” CIA – the World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html
(accessed July 5, 2013).
[36] “Military expenditures by
region,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed December 8, 2009).
[37] “The top ten military
spenders,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A (accessed December 8, 2009).
[38] SIPRI Yearbook 2013, “Armament,
Disarmament and International Security.” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), www.sipriyearbook.org (accessed July 5,
2013).
[39] SIPRI Yearbook 2013, “Armament, Disarmament and International
Security.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
www.sipriyearbook.org (accessed July 5, 2013).
[40] Dr. Thomas Blau and others,
“Small Nuclear Forces in South Asia,” in Small Nuclear Forces and U.S.
Security Policy, ed. Rodney W. Jones (Lexington Books: Lexington: 1984), 89
to 107).
[41] The term being introduced by
this writer herein for the first time considering that there are two nuclear
cauldrons in the world: Eastern Nuclear Cauldron comprising China, North Korea,
India, Pakistan, Israel, and (nuclear aspirant) Iran; and Western Nuclear
Cauldron comprising the US, Russia, the UK, and France. The nuclear weapon
states have been so categorized bearing in mind their location and areas of
nuclear interest. Russia’s case is a bit different. Considering its location,
it falls into the Eastern Nuclear Cauldron but from the point of view of its
nuclear interests, it is part of the Western Nuclear Cauldron. At any rate,
Russia’s nukes have been, and are still, playing a role in the security
paradigm of the West more than the East.
[42] “Status of
World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html (accessed
December 12, 2009).
[43] Gurpeet S. Khurana,
“China-India Maritime Rivalry,” Indian Defence Review, April 2009.
[44] As against state security, in
which state is the only security referent, individuals and communities are the
key referents in case of human security. The concept of human security, though
still evolving, was given a normative paradigm in UNDP’s Human Development
Report (HDR) – 1994. According to HDR-1994, human security comprises seven
subsets to include: political security, economic security, personal security,
community security, food security, health security and environmental security.
Three more subsets to include women security, children security and education
security have been added in the Human Security Framework for Pakistan, which
may be applicable to other peer countries, proposed in Ehsan Mehmood Khan, Human
Security in Pakistan (Islamabad: Narratives, 2013).
[45] Sundeep Waslekar, A Handbook
for Conflict Resolution in South Asia (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996),
4.
[46] Harold H. Saunders, The
Other Walls: the Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985), 24.
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